This post is based on a lecture done by my brilliant professor (and aspiring thesis adviser) Dr. Jerrold Garcia. He specializes in General Relativity and all the math that goes along with it, specifically Differential Geometry, Partial Differential Equations and Functional Analysis.

Gravity, as we know, is an attractive force that governs all matter. It is one of the four fundamental forces of nature and is by far the weakest among all of them. Although gravity is the weakest fundamental force, it is a force that can act along great distances. Its effect can be felt even if matter is millions of kilometers away from the gravitational source. It is the force that holds all the planets, stars, systems and galaxies together.

Now how are the forces of attraction between matter created by gravity? It is here that we turn to the mind of the greatest physicist of all time, Albert Einsten.

Before Einstein, it was thought that space and time were given absolutes, i.e. their properties remain the same in all physical situations. Space and time were not part of the physics itself. Space was fixed and was simply there to serve as the stage for physical laws. Time was also fixed as well, and served as the absolute medium for the succession of physical events. Just like a theatrical play: the actors are matter, the scripts are the laws of physics, and the stage is the space where the actors do their roles.

But Einstein told us that space and time are both part of the physics. They are not absolutes, but change with respect to the physics that is taking place all around the universe. This notion paved the way for Einstein to his theories of Special and General Relativity. Do not mistake the two as one and the same thing. Special Relativity (SR) is a revision of Classical Mechanics that takes into account speeds approaching that of the speed of light. On the other hand, General Relativity (GR) is a powerful revision of the classical laws of gravitation that takes into account the participation of space and time with physics.

We can now turn to the GR definition of gravity. Here’s a spoiler: No, it is not an attractive force as experience and common sense tells us. To understand Einstein’s notion of gravity we need the concept of a geodesic. A geodesic is the shortest path between two points that takes into account the property of the space between the two points. For a 2-dimensional Euclidean space (a flat plane), the shortest path between two points is a line. So, the geodesic for a flat plane is a line.

But let’s now take the surface of a sphere as an example. Do not mind what’s inside or outside the sphere, we are only interested in its surface. Now what is the geodesic between two points on a spherical surface? You might guess that it’s always along the path of circle that connects the two points, just like the lattitude and longitude coordinates in a globe. But in reality, this is not the case. For a spherical surface, the geodesic between two points is the path along the great circle that contains the two points. To be able to understand great circles, imagine making a straight cut that slices the sphere into two. Great circles are those circles that are made when a sphere is cut straight and the cut passes through the center/core of the sphere. If you still can’t believe that this is the geodesic for two points in a spherical surface, try it yourself. Draw two points on a sphere and connect them using a rubber string. You will see that the string will bend/stretch then coincide with the great circle containing the two points.

Knowing geodesics, let me now introduce you to the concept parallel lines. Imagine a flat plane having a line on it. Now for any point that is not part of the line, there is only one unique line that can be drawn through that point which is parallel to the first line. This is obvious. Now let’s go back to the spherical surface. Take the surface of the earth. If two people on different points of the earth start out parallel to each other and going to a certain direction say north, they will eventually end up meeting each other on the north pole. This gives us an idea that for any two points on a sphere, two seemingly parallel lines passing through each of the two points respectively will always meet.

What does the sphere have that always makes any two lines on it meet? It is a property of the sphere that we call curvature. No matter how you try to move two points along straight paths on a sphere, they will always end up meeting each other. It’s as if there is an attracting force that is going on between to the two points. Now what does this hypothetical force of attraction remind you of? Gravity.

Because all matter is affected by the gravitational forces of other matter, and because all these interaction take place within the fabric of spacetime, we can certainly say that spacetime itself is curved, just like a sphere. Gravity is the result of this curvature. This is the definition of gravity that Einstein arrived at.

Here it is. Matter tells spacetime to curve, the spacetime curvature tells matter how to move. This force of attraction is caused by the natural curvature of spacetime. Gravity is the curvature of spacetime. This is like the floor of the theater stage is made of rubber that can stretch and bend. The actors, having mass, streches the rubber. The curvature that results from this stretching is bended inward into the mass of each actor. This bending of the stage makes the actors off balance, making them stumble upon each other.

The question of the possibility of metaphysics is the chief subject matter of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. A crucial question can be asked on this account: How is metaphysics possible as a science?

For Kant, metaphysics is the summation of all knowledge that goes beyond the possibility of experience. It is beyond the human sensual scope that incorporates to us on what it means to experience something. We may ask, how can there be knowledge without experience? Do not be confused with such a question. Kant wants to illustrate that reason alone is sufficient for knowledge, but proven knowledge itself starts from the simultaneous interaction of reason and experience. There can be any kind of knowledge given to us, but experience is the key for validating knowledge. Experience is there to ensure that the knowledge we have is true. Here lies the connection between Kant’s question regarding synthetic a priori judgements and the question of metaphysics.

Synthetic a priori judgements are propositions that are non-tautological and at the same time, beyond experience.

I would like to point out that proposition, judgements, and statements are three different words that pertain to one and the same thing, merely that which can be falsified or be held true. We can say that a propositions is tautological if it contains predicates that is already contained or already known in the subject. An example of this is the mathematical statement 1 + 2 = 3. The numbers 1 and 2 along with their sum operation is already contained and is a constructive property of the number 3. It has been trivial whether all of mathematics is just a single tautology. This statement came from the brilliant philosopher-physicist-mathematician Henri Poincare.

Now in contrast to tautological statements, there are the non-tautological statements. Do not confuse the meaning of non-tautological as the same as the meaning of contradiction. My notion non-tautological applies to what comes from outside the subject itself. Non-tautological propositions are also called by the name of analytic propositions. Analytical, because such judgements involve the formation of new knowledge that is not contained in the knowledgeable concept itself. This new knowledge is something that is not given, or to put it in simpler terms, additional knowledge.

We can ask how such additional knowledge must have come from outside the givenness of the subject at hand. This seems impossible. For every concept and property attributed to the subject must already be contained in the subject itself. How is it possible that there is still further knowledge about the subject that comes from outside itself? Here is where I would like to put an analogy on two relations: the reason-experience relationship in Kant, and the theory-experiment relationship in the natural sciences.

Synthetic propositions, which state synthetic concepts of an object, not only play a ‘knowledge-adding’ role to the subject. Synthetic concepts must first play a confirmative role to the subject before it can be able to function as giving additional knowledge about the subject. What I mean by this is that synthetic propositions first prove analytical propositions, then goes to add knowledge on the subject concerned. Say that a bowling ball is a sphere, which is an analytic proposition. Now the proposition that a bowling ball can roll on flat ground is a synthetic one. But we must not be too quick in overlooking the fact that for the bowling ball to roll on flat ground, it has to be spherical (or in other cases, its surface must be curved) for it to roll. Simply put, the synthetic property of being able to roll is first and foremost a confirmation that a ball is a sphere.

Can we know through reason alone that a spherical ball can roll? Of course not. Here lies the relationship between reason and experience that I was talking about and that Kant was trying to put forth. Now it is through experience that we can get to confirm that a spherical ball can roll on flat ground. Having this idea in mind, it is now possible for us to state that reason brings in the pre-conditions necessary for the formation knowledge, and experience brings forth the confirmation of knowledge which finally forms it.

Let me now go back to what I have said about the analogy between reason-experience and theory-experiment. reason and theory both play the role of catalysts in the upcoming formation of knowledge,then experience and experiment bring in the confirmations, making the propositions of reason alone valid.

It seems like we must not rely so much on experience as a measuring device in assessing whether the propositions of reason are true. This is because our senses can trick us into making false statements. But again, this is where reason plays an important role. Reason is then the absolute tester, the validator of the validating experience. After experience has done its function of validating the presupposed knowledge that was made by reason alone, we go back to reason and inspect whether the validation made by experience is logically valid. This is like we put information into a computer, the computer processes it and produces the results, but we still bother to check whether the results agree with the logic of our reasoning.

The interplay between reason and experience brings us to state that reason alone cannot be used to arrive at truths. Experience must be used as a mediator between the presuppositions of reason and the logical inspection of the valid knowledge brought forth by experience. This relationship brings us back to the problem of metaphysics. Metaphysics cannot rely simply on its own metaphysical propositions to arrive at truths. It must be accompanied by experience in order to validate its contents. It’s no wonder why metaphysical systems that incorporate experiences are obviously more effective and significant than those who simply appeal to reason alone, a reason that lacks without experience.

This is why Immanuel Kant is recognized as one of the most important philosophers. He combined the rationale of the rationalists and the methods of the empiricists to put forth a philosophy that fuses both reason and experience into a vehicle for knowledge.

Science has been described by some people as silly because the language that it uses is hard to understand. They even brand it as just a show of intellectual power because of all the fuss it gives on equations, diagrams and graphs that seem to be of no meaning to the non-scientific person. By the way, I define science here to be the exact sciences and mathematics because these are the fields that people have difficulty in understanding. Now it’s safe to say that these sciences are the only fields of science that use mathematics as their main language. In this article, I will point out that the problem of comprehending a new or different language is the root cause of the discrimination of science.

The common notion of a scientist is someone with messy standing hair wearing a laboratory gown who seem to do all the weird and dangerous experiments. They are also weird in the sense of how they think about things scientifically and how they write symbols that look nonsense. This is all wrong. I myself is on the way to becoming a scientist, but I don’t associate myself with the descriptions listed above. I do think a lot about things, mostly with the use of logic, but my thoughts aren’t weird in any sense. When writing down symbols on paper, I’m simply using my own language, there’s nothing wrong with that. We only have to remember how we write symbols too in order to simplify our lecture notes back then inside the classroom.

When people see a technical paper on science, say about quantum field theory, people tend to be disgusted by what is written on it, i.e. the mathematical formulations. Why? Essentially, it’s because they encounter something which uses an entirely different sort of language, a language that they can’t understand. This is all there is to it. All the discriminating descriptions follow from this state of insufficient comprehensibility.

We know how a thirst of explanations is a very part of being human. People always need to understand. When people can’t understand something, and know that to understand it requires learning of all its prerequisites which can be very rigorous, they seem to be helpless about it. As a defense for this helplessness in comprehending the thing, people resort in ways of attacking the thing as absurd or weird. The ego strikes back and doesn’t want his understanding to be branded as insufficient. This kind of helplessness in comprehension, or what I may call insufficient comprehensibility, is different from incomprehensibility. There are things which we have insufficient comprehensibility of, but these things are still comprehensible if only we put effort in learning its prerequisites. This may be rigorous and outward challenging but given the time and effort, insufficient comprehensibility will be tranlated to comprehensibility. Laziness will only resort to crude ways of thinking that will keep one under the spell of insufficient comprehensibility.

Also, insufficient comprehensibility is only applicable to those topics which are certain to be comprehensible, given the time and effort. Topics such as God and justice are by no means scientifically comprehensible, they are incomprehensible for the methods of science. That’s why some see scientists as having a cold picture of the universe that is godless and without beauty because they don’t tackle the issues about virtues and all those metaphysical stuff. But to come to think of it, this branding of coldness in the view of scientists brings us back to the very dilenma of the problem of language.

When someone uses mathematics as a language, it doesn’t mean that the person is stripped naked of the notion of virtues and of beauty. Scientists don’t talk about God and beauty not because a scientist is not a believer of such, but because mathematical language cannot tackle such issues. There is a sense of humility and honesty in the part of mathematical language because it knows its limits. It knows that metaphysical issues are beyond its limits, it admits that it is incapable in tackling such issues. What could be more funny than a scientist writing down equations that describe God, justice and love?

I’ve heard philosophers and theologians talk about how science reduces the whole of nature in a box. But this box isn’t a mere reductionist box. This box is a treasure that is shared by all humans, a box that serves as an expression of human understanding. As was said by Albert Einstein: All our science, measured against reality, is primitive and childlike — and yet it is the most precious thing we have.

Let’s put our arguments to the extreme. Say that a scientist writes down symbols that explain something about God. For example, gamma = infinity, where gamma represents God. The equation states simply that God is infinite. People would argue that this is absurd, in reducing an interpretation of God to an equation and treating God as the gamma symbol. But isn’t this interpretation a merely different usage of terms from ordinary language? Yes indeed. Stating that an equation reduces God to a mathematical symbol is the same thing as stating that a statement of ordinary language reduces God to a word. Again, the problem of language shows itself.

Would there be any difference if history goes to repeat itself and people would choose to speak in the language of mathematics rather than the present ordinary language? I doubt it would bring much difference. People are very used to ordinary language, that’s why they have a hard time comprehending mathematical language. I believe that we all have equal capabilities in logic, it’s just that some of us have been very used to the frame of thinking given by ordinary language that makes it difficult for them to getting into the frame of scientific or mathematical thinking.

(This essay serves as the start of my project against the discrimination of science due to the problem of language. I hope to compile such essays in a future book. My thoughts and arguments may change from time to time, but my aim in defending science and securing its respectful place in society won’t)

Karl Popper stated that the more a theory forbids, the better it is. And it seems evident from the history of science that the better theory is always the one that can generalize more and does agree with the actual observations of nature. So how can a more generalized theory be possible if it undergoes greater restrictions than the less generalized ones?

Answering this question requires the help of another philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos. In his article which I read yesterday, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs", Lakatos defines a new way of looking at the progress of theories by appraising series of theories rather than single theories. One of his conditions for a theory to be falsified is if there exists another theory that has excess empirical content over the previous one. This clearly gives us a clue on how generalized theories comes up from previously falsified ones.

How about the idea that generalized theories forbid more than the less general ones? In Lakatos' opinion, this should not be so. He said that a given fact is explained scientifically only if a new fact is also explained with it. Thus, generalized theories don't necessarily forbid more, but they forbid less by providing more facts that not only has something to do with the theory, but with the previous one as well. The crucial element in falsification is whether a new theory offers any excess information compared with its predecessor and whether some of this excess information is improbable or forbidden in the light of the previous one.

We can also argue if falsification is necessary for the progress of theories. From Popper's point of view, this may be so. But for Lakatos, he states that falsification is not a sufficient condition for eliminating a previous theory. Science can grow without any refutations leading the way. For Popper's naive falsificationism, science grows through repeated experimental overthrow of theories. As for Lakatos' sophisticated falsificationism, improving theories can necessarily happen even before the previously accepted theories are refuted. In other words, for the naive falsificationist, falsified theories are replaced by better ones. While for the sophisticaed falsificationist, any theory must be replaced by a better one. This sheds off the need for falsification in order to improve theories. We must therefore be obliged to improve theories even before counterevidence comes up.

Again, how can a more generalized theory be possible if it undergoes greater restrictions than the less generalized ones? A theory does not become better by forbidding. Rather, it becomes better by less forbiding along with its logical correctness in doing so. But don't forget that it is in the light of the previous theory that a part of this excess correctness is owed to. The improvement of theories must be taken by a succession of theories, not by singling out each theory. In this manner, the progess of theories can be said to have a historical character in it.

Reference:

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 

Based on one of my previous essays about getting started with Kant's thought, I hope to discuss his thought here in more detail after I become much more oriented and at ease with the content of his works, and probably after reading Theodor Adorno's book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Indeed, this will take me some time. Understanding Kant as well as other philosophers is a very wonderful thing, but to produce something out of our understanding is more crucial. The point of philosophy is not merely to be kept within our minds as a sort of collected scholarly knowledge. To actually live out the philosophies and see the world with respect to these ideas should be the main point in understanding philosophy.

Philosophers are strict and dedicated writers and lecturers. They have a very powerful compulsion that requires their thoughts to be written down or spoken with the most appropriate words possible. These thoughts either come from personal reflection or from thinking about another philosopher's thoughts. The thinking that makes these thoughts involve perpetual and rigorous reflections that couldn't be done without pure dedication and discipline. In other words, philosophers are also the most disciplined thinkers.

I admire philosophers who seem to deliver a nearly perfect explanation (use of words) of their thoughts in situations where there are no space for drafts and corrections. These situations are in the form of lectures and interviews. There is no way one can deliver such perfect use of language all the time without being used to doing it, i.e. without internalizing such use of language within all aspects of their lives. Their strict application of language is evident even in the most casual or simple situations that frequently happen in their daily lives.

People probably wonder why I blog strictly and seriously. This is my own way of training myself in producing my own thoughts efficiently (whether it be in philosophy or technical science) and using language in a much articulate manner. I used to be fond of knowing about things, of absorbing information. But I eventually came to a point where all of what I knew felt like nonsense if I only continued to be lazy from making deep and insightful reflections and reactions. As what Albert Einstein said, the mind who gets used to merely gaining information will only resort to stubborn ways of thinking. There is only the input of knowledge. Without the process of critical thinking, there will be no output. Knowledge is of no significance if one doesn't also produce or develop his own thoughts regarding the matters at hand. The mind will only be a storage of information, just like a computer, without really processing the information for reflection and revision.

As a conclusion, knowledge without critical reflection and reactionary activity is nonsense. Critical reflection is necessary to revise and improve our ways of thinking about things. Knowledge cannot remain static within our minds, it should become dynamic with deep thinking in order to produce important utility. Also, such learned ideas should give us the option to react and explain our stand, if we are to agree, oppose or revise. Our efforts in reacting and making our stand enables us to act and respond to the world that is more appreciating than previously considered. As said by one of my brilliant colleagues, "think think think", then move with it.

It seems easy for people to talk about science as a whole and to give a brief statement about what it generally does. But the problem starts when we try to try distinguish between the exact sciences and the other sciences. These fields range from the social sciences (political science, psychology, etc) and the exact sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.). We can also consider the pseudo-sciences, specifically astrology. For this essay, I will deal with the following question: What distinguishes Physics, as well as the other exact sciences, from the other fields posing as sciences?

This question was answered by one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, Karl Popper. Karl Popper was one of the pioneers of contemporary philosophy of science and was also a big defender of rationalism. He stated that critical discussion or the testing of ideas is needed in order to advance our knowledge of the world. This stems from the phrase that has been his theme for his whole philosophical project, “I may be right and you may be wrong, but together we can get closer to the truth.”

Compared with the other fields, it’s safe to say that the exact sciences have already advanced far more than the others have. Physicists are getting close to finding a theory of everything and biologists have already found the blueprint of life, the DNA. We can explain these advancements by noting Karl Popper’s requirement of testing in order to advance, i.e. that the exact sciences have experienced far more rigorous testing than their other scientific counterparts. This is because the exact sciences seemed to be more testable than the other fields.

How can we prove that the exact sciences are more testable than the other fields? Let’s have Sigmund Freud’s theory of psycho-analysis as an example. Psycho-analysis has been one of the most impressive theories in psychology because of its explanatory power. It seemed to be able to explain everything about human behavior. The world was just full of verifications of the theory. In other words, the theory always fitted and was always confirmed by every situation regarding human behavior. Explanatory power seemed to be the theory’s strength. But Popper noted that this ‘strength’ was in fact its very weakness.

Now take for example, the theory of relativity. Einstein’s theory predicted that light passsing nearby a massive object must be attracted by it. In other words, that light is affected by gravity. As a consequence, the bending of light can be accurately calculated using the theory of relativity. From here, observations can be conducted to show if the calculations are correct. The theory was finally confirmed by an expedition during a solar eclipse where the amount of bending of light from a nearby star agreed with the predictions of the theory.

One very notable aspect about the case of relativity is that a risk was involved during the process of confirming its predictions. If the observations didn’t agree with the predictions of the theory, then it must simply be refuted. This wasn’t the case for Freud’s psycho-analysis. The theory in question was compatible with most human behavior and, if there were instances that didn’t agree with the theory, they would not really put the theory in danger of being refuted. But in the case of relativity, a simple incompatible observation can easily spell doom for the theory.

To sum up the comparison of the previous examples, we can say that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, refutability or testability.

To illustrate this further and to end the discussion, I’ll take the example of astrology. Astrology did not pass the test of falsification. Astrologers, by making their interpretations and prophecies sufficiently vague, were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophecies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory, making the theory irrefutable. The price for this is that the theory is no longer considered a true science but a pseudo-science.

Reference:

Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. (London, 1963)

Philosophy of science concerns itself in thinking and explaining the workings of science in a different light from the interpretations of the typical scientist or layman. This is a field that I think is usually vindicated by hardcore scientists who think that doing objective science in itself is enough to seek the truth. 'Doing' objective science is different from 'thinking' about it. 'Doing' means that you are having a first hand experience of science. This is the usual stuff that scientists do like deriving equations and experimenting. 'Thinking' about science involves going out-of-the-box from typical science research. Then by using rational logic, you arrive at methodological truths or explanations about science. In this essay, I will try to 'think' about science and show why this is important as well.

Honestly, I really don't know much about this field (philosophy of science) yet but I'm starting to get very interested because it associates itself with another love of my life, physics. At first I thought that you have to study the philosophy ontologically, i.e. you have to study the historical progression of its thoughts and philosophers starting from the early times (from Aristotle's Physics). But eventually, I knew that you can start with the field by starting with contemporary philosophy of science. Its a good thing to know the thought of its philosophers ontologically but I think this is more suited to people who are pursuing a philosophical career. But the safest route in learning this field is to start from the modern period of philosophy because this is when rationalism and empiricism became very prominent. These modes of thought are very much related to the methods and thinking of science.

The reason why it's best to start with modern philosophy is because it builds you up to the thoughts of the absolutely amazing and influential Immanuel Kant. Kant's thought has been very influential to the thinkers that followed his time. He is also regarded as a major influence by many contemporary philosophers of science. Although knowing Kant is will be very fruitful to me, I admit that I'm having a very difficult time understanding his thought. And who didn't have a a hard time in understanding his thought anyway? Those who think they understood Kant with ease are those who, in reality, understand him less.

As far as I can get, I tried to start reading one of his short essays on mathematics just a few weeks ago. It was very hard reading indeed. I've only gotten to the first three paragraphs but my mind was already full of blurs. The hardest part so far in understanding him is how you can be able to put coherence in what he writes. In my case, this seems to be very hard because Kant forces me to focus on understanding every statement he states. This leaves me with almost no energy to build up a coherent picture or thought with just one paragraph!

So before reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, you have to be prepared for it by reading some prerequisite materials. The best of such materials would be Kant's Prolegomena, it is a popularization of his motives and thoughts in the Critique. It is much easier to understand and is short compared to the bulk size of the Critique. Another useful material (which I just found out yesterday by browsing in the library) would be reading Theodor Adorno's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason". So far, it is the clearest secondary material I've encountered. I was stuck for hours reading the first two lectures inside the library. Adorno's book is a must for anyone who plans to pursue the Critique. Other suggestions which came from book reviews and philosophers are reading Sebastian Gardner's "Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason" and Kant's own book, Logic. I've also browsed Gardner's book yesterday but found it to be a little more technical for such a guide. Again, Adorno's book is a must-read.

You don't have to worry about wasting time in learning philosophy starting from the ancient period in order to learn philosophy of science, which is contemporary. As what Theodor Adorno said, you won't go far and will utterly fail if you don't make assumptions during the process of learning new systems of thought. In pursuing the prerequisites of a certain philosophy, you have to stop where you can safely make assumptions and work your way from there. This statement also works in the field of mathematics, where assumptions are necessary even in the most basic arithmetic. But a discussion of this philosophy of mathematics requires space for an essay other than I am presently discussing.

They say that all men are born equal but grow unequal. As time elapses, a minor group of people just become much brilliant than the rest of the majority. Some can take on hard work or understand things with ease while others just have a hard time doing so. People who consider themselves inferior to others with respect to certain tasks probably feel that the quality of growth they get is not as healthy as the brilliant ones have. Now how can we justify this inequality in ability and still be able to bring a sort of equality into it?

The first idea I have in mind is to ask if brilliant people generally are fulfilled in their lives. I think not. It’s common that brilliant ones achieve a lot and as a result, get recognition. But I don’t equate this with my definition of fulfillment. Having fulfillment for something requires a kind of effort and discipline that can only be attained by experiencing difficulty. Contrary to this follows my definition of brilliance, which is the ability to easily execute tasks that others find very difficult to.

Let me put up an example. Consider the case of a student who finds it very hard to put a disciplined effort on what seemed to be an unappealing subject for him. I say unappealing because for me, I find it very hard to focus on something that is not of my interest. Disinterest comes from disability. Then the student nevertheless pushed himself to study the subject intensively, found difficulty along the way, but still managed to regain his focus on it. Now comes the result. People will think that the student should deserve a high grade. But what if he didn’t? Does getting a low grade mean that all his efforts were put to a waste?

Referring to the definition of fulfillment, it’s the effort in doing a difficult act itself that makes everything worthwhile. This may sound unfair but it really isn’t. Again, the problem is that we always equate effort with achievement, and not with fulfillment. Now think about it, without the given effort, the student could have easily failed the subject. Fulfillment is more an activity than a result. It involves an active participation to a task that would seem hopeless to pursue.

From here lies a comparison of fulfillment with brilliance. Brilliance is nothing in itself if it is not worked out. People may describe themselves as brilliant in certain tasks, but how can they be so sure without even using it on things that could have been very difficult for others? Without being active, people who call themselves brilliant seldom make up their mind about what they really want. They become passive about things because they know that they can efficiently pull off most of the tasks that are given to them. Passivity closes the self from the world. It puts the self on a standstill while the world attends to its needs from it.

On the other hand, activity (i.e. being active) opens the self to the world. It brings in possibilities to the self that attends to the world. People who truthfully humble themselves when it comes to their capabilities are the ones who usually go out to the world and find aspects of it that they really become part of. This becomes possible because they don’t consider themselves brilliant, so they seek ways of becoming so.

There might be an inequality in growth, but being active destroys the bounds of your growth and comparison becomes null. From the most specific to the most general details, each self’s pursuance and attention to the world is entirely unique. This is a kind of uniqueness that dissolves comparison, thus giving each person his own take on defining self-brilliance.

I’ve made my point. What matters the most is being active in seeking the tasks that delight us the most. Brilliance that is defined by comparison is minor because it negates the self from being active. But self-defined brilliance is an entirely different thing. This can only be found through one’s formation of fulfillment. Fulfillment puts our difficult efforts on the highest pedestal. There may be geniuses and valedictorians, but it’s not about what they were able to do with their lives, it’s about what you can do for yours. Theirs are just the exceptional cases that people have put too much attention on.

I’m very much interested in philosophy and physics. Physics has captivated me with its methods of making mathematical models of all these fascinating physical phenomena. It has also worked out perfectly well with my skills in logic. Yeah, I will surely dedicate a life in physics. As for philosophy, it challenges me to think more about reality. It refines my way of thinking about various aspects of reality such as ethics, metaphysics and language. I’m very much attracted by philosophers and how they try to convey their thought in a very elegant and intellectual manner. The best thing that philosophy did to me so far was motivating and improving my use of proper/formal language.

People always ask how I’m able to be interested in two seemingly different and clashing modes of thought. As a matter of fact, there is a noticeable tension between the methods of both areas. Natural science has criticized philosophy for being too abstract, uncertain, and to be seemingly nonsense. It is described as nonsense because the statements of philosophy cannot be proved literally by the use of senses. On the other hand, philosophy have attacked natural science because it focuses too much on the physical or ‘lowly’ world of beings, it emphasizes the importance of transcending physical reality in order to be on a higher state of being and thinking.

Let me now try to answer why I like these two areas and how I cope with it. First of all, physics itself cannot be the whole truth of all reality, but only of physical reality. It is of my personal preference that I get to be fascinated by physical phenomena that I’d go and dedicate my life to physics. It is one of the most important inventions of mankind because its method is always a sure proof of gathering knowledge. Well, I even think that it is an intellectual undertaking that has reached the farthest among all other undertakings. Physics, along with its massive amount of mathematical rigor, is personally very suited to my skills in logic. I find it fun and pleasurable to use logic in every situation that calls for it. And I don’t think anybody can deny the power of logic.

As for philosophy, it has motivated me to live in order to think. Philosophy gave me a new light on how I plan to pursue my life. For me, experiencing knowledge is the most important attainment that one could have. Money and fame doesn’t even match to the glory that knowledge brings. It has refocused my actions from worldly things to those I can bring with me all my life. For the most part, philosophy is very much the same as physics in making knowledge its main concern.

Now let me argue why philosophy and physics are complementary to me. In a simple phrase: Physics is the gaining of new facts, while philosophy is the gaining of new knowledge of facts (I got this statement from my Philosophy of Language course). If I were to be interested only in physics, then I wouldn’t go far in really attaining knowledge. I would only be able to understand reality in a shallow level because I would be limited to physical facts. Now if philosophy were to complement my learning of physics, then that would be an entirely different issue. Philosophy would provide me the tools necessary to engage in a deeper contemplation of reality from the physical facts that I’ve learned from physics. Gravity isn’t merely gravity. By incorporating a deeper understanding about it in a non-physical approach, I get to acknowledge its implications not only for the science but for society as well. Gravity then, is a force that gives puzzlement to our minds more than what the equations tell.

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